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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/07/2011

Accident number: 756

Accident time: 10:14

Accident Date: 07/03/2007

Where it occurred: CBU 19, Area 4, Taibe
Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: 001/2007

Country: Lebanon
Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 19/03/2007
Name of source: UN MACC SL

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: M77 submunition

Ground condition: agricultural (recent)
grass/grazing area
Date last modified: 15/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 0

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: UTM: 734100:3684648 Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate equipment (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate survey (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
non injurious accident (?)

Accident report
The report of this incident was made available by the UN MACC in 2008. Its conversion into a
DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is
editorial. The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
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MINE ACTION COORDINATION CENTRE, SOUTHERN LEBANON
BAC INCIDENT REPORT 001/2007
Report on Incident that occurred on the 19th Mar 2007 [actually 7th] at CBU 19, at Taibe.
1. BACKGROUND
Date: 8 March 2007 [sic]
Time of Incident: 1000 hrs approx.
Location: At Taibe, Area 4, Lebanon
Task: CBU-19, Task Dossier 4-003
UTM of Task: 734100 – 3684648
Task Start / Finish Date: 19 Feb 07 / 01 Mar 07
Organisation Involved: [Demining group]. Unit: BAC Team: 7
Supervisor: [Name removed] – BAC Team 7
Reported by: [Name removed] (03-854724) Local (land owner).
Reported to: [Name removed] (MACC Community Liaison Officer)
Time of Incident report to MACC QA: 1014hrs approx.
Organisation POC: [Name removed], Project Manager, [Demining group]
Investigation Date/Time: 08 March 07, 1245hrs Mar 07
Investigation Location: Task CBU-19
Investigation Team: Capt [Name removed] (LAF QA Officer), [Name removed] (MACC Chief
of QA), [Name removed] (MACC QA Officer).
ERW Type: US M-77 Submunition
Accreditation Details: Provincial Accreditation - 28 Oct to 27 Nov 06; Full accreditation: 27
Nov 06 to 31 Dec 07.
2. DETAILS OF INCIDENT
On 07 March 2007, one M-77 Submunition was located by a local shepherd while tending his
sheep, at Task CBU-19, in an area which had been cleared by [Demining group] using
surface / visual Battle Area Clearance (BAC) procedures. The shepherd reported the find to
the land owner [Name removed].
On 08 March 2007, [Name removed] (MACC CLO) arrived at the task to conduct a QA
Completion Survey and was informed of the submunition by the land owner. After confirming
the type and location, he informed [Name removed] (MACC QA Completion Assistant), who
subsequently informed [Name removed] (MACC Chief of QA). The Completion was
postponed and the site closed pending the arrival of [Name removed], the [Demining group]
Project Manager.
[Demining group] was informed by the MACC SL of the situation and [Name removed] visited
the site to liaise with [Name removed]. After receiving authorization from the MACC SL Chief
of QA, [Name removed] immediately organised for BAC Team 7 to sub-surface clear a 50m2
box around the item for verification purposes.
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The MACC BOI team arrived at the site, took photographs of the submunition and interviewed
[Name removed] and [Name removed].
Evidence
The ground is flat, comprising compact soil and covered in short vegetation. The M-77
submunition was surrounded on three sides by light vegetation and positioned on its side with
approximately two thirds buried. The location of the submunition had been marked by
[Demining group] with red spray paint (boundary), red sprayed rocks (to one side) and red /
white danger area marking tape (boundary).
Interview with [Demining group representative 1]
[Name removed] informed the MACC SL Investigation team that the area where the M-77 was
located had been cleared using surface/visual BAC procedures. He said that while working at
the task, the team had located and destroyed 9 M-77 submunitions and that 10% sub-surface
sampling had been conducted in the surface cleared areas. He said that no submunitions or
other ERW had been located within the sampled areas.

The large rock marks the location

The M77 submunition
3. CONCLUSIONS
On 07 March 2007, a local shepherd discovered an M-77 submunition on an area of land
which had been cleared by [Demining group] using surface/visual BAC procedures. The
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information was received by [Name removed] (MACC CLO) the following day on arrival at the
site for a QA Completion Survey.
The submunition was positioned on its side, with approximately 2/3 buried, and was
surrounded by light vegetation. According to [Name removed] (MACC CLO), the shepherd
had removed some of the vegetation when he discovered it.
The submunition is considered as missed and should have been located by [Demining group]
during the BAC operations.
The incident was Preventable.
4. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
07 March 2007
AM: Local shepherd discovered M-77 submunition at CBU-19 and reported it to [Name
removed] (land owner).
08 March 2007 (approx.)
1000hrs: [Name removed] (MACC CLO) arrived at the CBU-19 to conduct a QA Completion
Survey. He was informed of the incident by [Name removed].
1005hrs: [Name removed] (MACC CLO) confirmed the location and type of UXO.
1014hrs: [Name removed] (MACC CLO) informed [Name removed] (MACC QA Completion
Assistant). [Name removed] informed [Name removed] (MACC Chief of QA).
1030hrs: [Name removed] ([Demining group] Project Manager) arrived at CBU-19.
1100hrs: [Name removed] ([Demining group] BAC Team 7 Supervisor) and Team 7 arrived at
CBU-19. Clearance commenced around the submunition.
1145hrs: [Name removed] informed [Name removed] (QA Officer) of the incident.
1245hrs: MACC SL Investigation team - Capt [Name removed] (LAF QA Officer), [Name
removed] and [Name removed] arrived at CBU-19 for investigation.
1330hrs: MACC Investigation Team departed CBU-19.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER ACTIONS
[Demining group] have completed verification of the immediate area of the incident by
clearing a 50m2 box around the submunition using sub-surface BAC procedures. No items of
ERW were located.
[Demining group] shall conduct 1 day’s refresher training for BAC Team 7 for surface BAC
procedures prior to commencing operations.
[Demining group] Project Manager has submitted an amendment to their BAC SOP pertaining
to visual / instrument assisted surface clearance. This procedure shall take immediate effect
and the SOP shall be reviewed by the MACC SL.
[Demining group] shall conduct the Completion Survey and request the MACC SL to conduct
a QA Completion Survey of CBU-19.
[Demining group] have submitted a pertinent investigation report. [Not made available.]
Mine Action Organisations should use instruments to assist when conducting intrusive surface
BAC, where required.
6. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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See the following:
Photographs of incident site.
Incident report by MACC CLO 02.
[Demining group] Incident Report (electronic copy to be sent by [Demining group]). [Not made
available.]
Report Written By:
Capt. [Name removed], LAF QA Officer. [Name removed], MACC SL QA Officer, 08 March
2007
1. Comments by the MACC SL Chief of QA
[Name removed], UN Chief QA, MACC SL
Seen/Agreed
2. Comments by the MACC SL Chief of Operations
[Name removed], UN Chief of Operations, MACC SL
Seen/Agreed
3. Comments by the MACC SL Programme Manager
[Name removed], UN Programme Manager, MACC SL
Seen/Agreed
4. Comments by the NDO Representative to MACC SL
[None]

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Inadequate Survey because the area had been
subjected to a surface search when it should have been sub-surface searched. The decision
to conduct superficial surface search in an agricultural area was the responsibility of the
MACC SL, the same body that investigated the incident, so no independent investigation was
made. The secondary cause is listed as a Management control inadequacy because of the
failings of the Tasking by the SL MACC.
The visual search of an area is not “clearance” as defined in the IMAS and increases the risk
of civilian injury because it encourages them to think that the area is safe to use.
The Inadequate equipment referenced under Notes refers to the lack of a means of searching
sub-surface (metal-detector). No criticism of the demining group is implied – it was carrying
out the task as approved by the UN supported MACC.
It may be interesting to note that a commercial demining group missed a device (for whatever
reason) and was only required to re-search 50 square metres centred on that device, which
took less than a day, so may not have been much of an incentive to ensure that no others
were missed.
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